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Introduction: The "Amir" of Western Afghanistan 
The planned September national elections in Afghanistan are viewed by the United States as critical in 
broadening the legitimacy of Kabul and strengthening its authority to address the persisting problems of 
violent extremism, factionalism, drugs, and human rights. In addition, the elections may represent an 
expansion of Kabul's authority in the regional provinces. Recent violence in Afghanistan, however, has 
again raised questions about whether the country can successfully hold its first post-Taliban elections. 
Important considerations for the ultimate success of the elections are how the elections are viewed and 
supported by Afghan regional power brokers and commanders as well as by Afghan's regional neighbors. 
The purpose of this essay is to assess Ismail Khan, one such power broker, and his relationship with Iran. 
There is little doubt that Ismail Khan, self-proclaimed Amir of Western Afghanistan, has important ties and 
relationships with Iran.  
 
Ismail Khan is a Persian speaking Sunni Tajik who in March 1979, as a Major in Afghan army, led the 
original mutiny/insurrection against the Taraki regime's Sawr (or April) Revolution (Taraki's inspired 
Afghan societal liberalization and land reform). Khan's revolt resulted in the slaughter of Soviet Afghan 
advisors and their families. This insurrection was met by a brutal Afghan and Soviet response that killed 
an estimated 24,000 Heratis in a single week and destroyed much of the famous Central Asian crossroad 
city. Khan's insurrection was a significant impetus for the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
For the next decade Khan waged a bitter guerrilla war against Soviet occupation[1] . Despite the 
devastation around him, eventually Khan disarmed the population and established an effective 
administration with functioning health care and schools in three western Afghan provinces. In 1992, two 
years after the Soviets left Afghanistan, Khan's militia took back Herat and Khan declared himself Amir of 
the West. 
In March 1995, the Taliban captured the provinces of Nimruz and Farah. The Taliban marched on 
Shindand (a large former Soviet-build air base) but Khan, with help from Massoud, repelled them. Khan 
later maneuvered south and launched an offensive against the Taliban in Kandahar, but the Taliban 
regrouped with help from Pakistan's ISI and new recruits from Pakistani madrassas. Simultaneously, 
Uzbek General Rashid Dostum switched sides to the Taliban and his air force started to bomb Herat; 
Khan retreated and the Taliban overran his forces.[2]  
 
In September 1995, Khan and some 8,000 men fled to Mashhad, Iran, after the fall of Herat. Khan 
returned in October 1996 and joined forces with Dostum in Badghis province. 
The Taliban eventually captured Khan in May 1997 after being betrayed by General Abdul Malik,one of 
Dostum's Deputies. Khan had gone to Mazar to meet with Dostum who by this time had rejoined the 
Taliban. After his arrest, Khan was put in a Kandahari prison.  
In March 1999, Khan escaped to Iran with the help of two Taliban guards who were former mujahideen. 
After September 11th and the start of United States' war against the Taliban, Khan returned and took 
Herat back after the Taliban fled.  
 
Ismail Khan rules Herat like a duke and is regarded with suspicion and resentment in Kabul. Yet Khan is 
a popular and independent leader of Herat, a large province in western Afghanistan, adjacent to Iran.  
Khan was and is a bitter enemy of the Taliban who was clearly considered one of the most prominent and 
effective commanders against the Soviets during the Afghan jihad. Since the defeat of the Taliban he has 
defied Hamid Karzai and the central government, refusing to hand over to Kabul most of the tax and 
customs revenue he has collected. This has caused considerable consternation towards Khan in Kabul. 
Although he was one of the least tainted of the mujahideen commanders, Human Rights Watch has 
recently cited him and his militia leaders for alleged arbitrary arrests, illegal detentions and Taliban-like 
intrusions on people who do not conform to rigid Islamic behavior. Though Khan could be ruthless, he 
tended to seek reconciliation rather than revenge during the war with the Soviets. Moreover, Khan has 
not been linked to the kinds of massacres and atrocities regularly attributed to other commanders. Nor is 
there evidence of Khan's involvement in opium production or trafficking, unlike many of the Afghan 
warlords. Do these facts make Ismail Khan a proponent of Western-style democracy? Certainly not, but 
the lack of combat atrocities and the absence of involvement in narcotics production or trade is relatively 
rare for Afghan leaders. 
Herat and Iran 
Herat, for centuries the crossroad for competing Turkic and Persian empires, is a cradle of Afghanistan's 
history and civilization and has had historic ties to Persia and the Silk Road trade routes. Herat is 
frequently cited as both the best and the worst example of postwar Afghanistan. Herat's advantageous 
geographical position and accompanied wealth is complemented by the fact that Khan is a legendary 
commander and much venerated and revered by the majority of Heratis. Khan has repaved roads, is 
upgrading parks, building schools, cleaning streets and erecting monuments, thanks to the substantial 
influx of customs revenue he collects from the busy border crossing with Iran - money that Karzai's 
government says belongs to the central government[3]. The BBC has reported that millions of dollars in 
tax revenues are collected every month -- little, if any, of which is sent to Kabul[4].  
Much of Khan's success is clearly attributable to the fact that Herat is now the most prosperous city in 
Afghanistan, which reflects its location as a crossroads between the Gulf and Central Asia, bordering both 
Iran and Turkmenistan. Khan and his administration have remarkably rebuilt a city that was nearly totally 
devastated during the wars with the Soviets and the Taliban[5]. "Khan has provided a degree of security, 
education, and food supplied unrivaled in the rest of the country"[6].  
 
Iran has traditionally had close relationships with Herat and probably will continue to have close 
relationships, regardless of the position of Ismail Khan. Iran shares a 400-mile border with Western 
Afghanistan and Tehran has always felt a sense of possession towards Herat. Khan has used this 
dynamic to his advantage over the years during which Iran has supplied him with significant resources in 
his campaigns against both the Soviets and Taliban[7]. For decades Khan has had a clear quid pro quo 
with Iran. During the jihad against the Soviets, Iran supplied Khan with fuel, ammunition, and arms in 
exchange for use of Shindand as an air bridge to Shi'a communities in Hazarajat. Likewise during his 
battles with the Taliban whom were particularly disdained by the Iranians, Khan received considerable 
Iranian material support.  
 
Khan is by no means the only Afghan leader to receive considerable Iranian support and resources. Iran 
has played all sides of the Afghan conflict. Iran, for example, played a significant role in arming the 
Northern Alliance. General Mohammed Fahim[8], Afghan Defense Minister and Deputy President, as well 
as other Tajiks now controlling key central government ministries have depended heavily on Iranian 
support during their decade long struggle against the Taliban. Many of these ministers have been 
persistently courted by Iran, which was the first country to reopen its embassy in Kabul[9].  
Since the Karzai Government was installed in Kabul, Iran's foreign ministry has organized a series of 
private trips to Tehran for key members of the Karzai government, including Defense Minister Fahim, 
Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah, Interior Minister Yunis Qanuni, and National Security Chief Aref 
Sarwari. "Without Iran, most Northern Alliance commanders couldn't have operated in Afghanistan at a 
time when they had no other source of international support," says a senior Afghan government source. 
"Almost every important Afghan commander has family living in Iran and most of them were educated in 
fundamentalist religious schools, or madrassas[10]."  
 
After the defeat of the Taliban when many of Afghanistan's interloping neighbors vied for advantage - 
almost mimicking the geopolitics of the 19th Century "Great Game" - it was reported that Iran had 
supplied Khan with at least twenty truck loads of cash between November and December 2001 to secure 
loyalty of his forces in Herat[11].  
 
During this time Iran also sent large stocks of weapons to Herat and Khan, which culminated in the United 
States firing a cruise missile at Khan's Headquarters, killing eighteen of his men in January 2002[12]. The 
Bush Administration is obviously extremely concerned about Iranian influence in Afghanistan.  
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Ismail Khan: Iranian Lackey or Independent, Nationalist Regional Leader? 
The understandable United States concern of Iranian influence on Ismail Khan depends upon the 
assumption that Khan has been co-opted by the Iranians. Is there any validity to this concern? 
Politics in Afghanistan have always been local and Afghan leaders like Khan have traditionally used 
whoever is exploitable for their best advantage. Indeed, Afghans are famous for shifting and changing 
alliances. This phenomenon is illustrated by Pakistan's ISI Afghan Section's motto: "you cannot buy an 
Afghan, but you can rent one." 
Regardless of motivations, Iran has genuinely helped the people of Herat and Western Afghanistan, as 
well as the Northern Alliance as a whole in their battles against the Soviets and the Taliban. Moreover, 
Iran not only served as a place of exile for Khan[13], but it also accepted over two million Afghans during 
the war with the Soviets and, unlike Pakistan, integrated these refugees into Iranian society. This has all 
occurred in the context where Iranians have traditionally looked down on Afghans as impoverished 
cousins while Afghans have regarded their powerful neighbor with suspicion. 
Ismail Khan has demonstrated that he is a pragmatic Afghan nationalist who abhors foreign influence. 
Khan himself downplays his relationship with Iran and states that it is a "disgrace to be dependent on 
outside help…after the experiences the Russians and the Pakistanis had with us, every neighbor should 
know that it does not pay to meddle in our affairs[14]."  
 
Indeed Khan has been extremely reluctant to be co-opted by outside influence. For example, in the 
summer of 1986 Khan disbanded Sunni (but not Shi'a) Hezbollah groups operating near Herat who were 
supported by Iran[15]. He also expelled Arab volunteers in the West during the jihad against Soviets 
because of their fanaticism and scorning of Afghan traditions[16], unlike other commanders. And, of 
course, during the long war with Soviets, Khan abhorred Pakistani influence and mujahideen leaders who 
accepted it. After the liberation of Herat from the Taliban, a Shi'a Muslim and Iranian-supported group, 
Hezb-e-Wahdat, was furious with Khan because they were not given any positions of power despite their 
joint effort in ousting the Taliban. Khan's refusal to share any power with Hezb-e-Wahdat would appear to 
be powerful inferential evidence of Khan's reluctance to give an Iranian-supported group explicit political 
influence in Herat.  
 
Journalists have reported that not a single dollar of promised aid by the international community has 
reached Herat and, regardless of the influx into Herat of Iranian aid, "nobody in his town, Khan believes, 
would want to give Iran a role in Afghan politics[17]." 
Khan plays down his relationship with Iran. "The Iranians are good neighbors, nothing else," and points 
out that the two countries share a four-hundred-mile-long border, which is crossed by traders every day. 
Khan has conceded, "Iran supported the struggle of the mujahideen, as did other countries," but 
dismisses the charges that he received arms from Iran as late as 2002[18].  
 
When asked by EurasiaNet if he was "Iran's man in Afghanistan," Khan replied: 
I have to say very unambiguously that for the last 23 years of civil and foreign war in 
Afghanistan, it was only Iran and China that were consistent in their support of us. 
Now, about relations between us and Iran, there are a lot of malicious lies and distortion. 
Yes, it is true that we have a lot of respect for Iran. First, we have no alternative- we are 
neighbors and we have a long border with them. Second, during the jihad and resistance 
years, Iran gave us critical support. They never wavered in this. You must know 
something, we Afghans never forget it when a stranger offers us help. Third, we have an 
important business relationship through Islam Ghalleh and Dougharoun [between 
Mashhad and Herat]. Fourth, Iran hosted more than 3 million Afghan refugees and they 
were taken care of reasonably well. 
We are rebuilding the country and we need friends. We need Iran's friendship. That 
doesn't mean we lose our independence or they have undue influence on us. I'm sure the 
Iranians have no plan to attack our country or anything like that- and if they did it would 
be a mistake.[19] 
Khan has always been independent, even from his Afghan brethren. While he accepted arms and 
resources from Jamiat-i-Islami and Rabbani, he refused their authority. Many of his current problems 
apparently stem from the fact that he openly disdains Karzai and makes no secrets about it. Yet he was 
pragmatic enough to recognize Kabul's eventual role in the future Afghanistan and consented when his 
son -- Mirwais Sadiq -- was appointed Karzai's Minister of Labor and Social Affairs. 
Despite Khan's pragmatism and pronouncements of independence from foreign influence, the United 
States is extremely nervous concerning Iranian influence in Afghanistan. This concern is highlighted by 
reports such as the one published in Insight on the News Website stating that: 
According to intelligence reports, three Iranian Revolutionary Guard officers were killed 
during 2001 in U.S. air strikes against the Taliban army's 17th Detachment in the western 
Afghan province of Herat, which now is ruled by Iran's close ally, Ismail Khan. Advised by 
as many as 10 Iranian generals who are operating undercover as Afghans, Khan is 
believed to be planning the creation of a 'Western Federation' that eventually might 
challenge Kabul's rule[20].  
Should one find it unusual at all that Khan was being advised by Iranian Generals during the height of the 
United States and the Northern Alliance's campaign against the Taliban? Khan had just returned from his 
exile in Iran to rejoin the Northern Alliance and recognizing his long-standing relationship with the 
Iranians, it seems reasonable to expect such council. While Khan considers his role as "Amir" of Western 
Afghanistan seriously and openly challenges Kabul's leadership, there has been no evidence that he 
plans to create a formal, break-away "Western Federation," much less become a pawn of the Iranians. 
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The Legacy of Afghan Regional Politics 
Afghanistan has always been a tribal, segmented country with Kabul exerting little influence on the 
provinces. "Fiefdoms" have clearly been established by Khan and others such as Uzbek General 
Dostum[21], who repeatedly has challenged Kabul's control over the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif; 
Ismailis (in alliance with Dostam) in Pul-i-Khumri; the Tajiks in the Northeast, and multiple Pashtun 
powerbrokers in the Eastern provinces. Such regional spheres of influence have long dominated Afghan 
politics and reflected in provincial leadership. They are an established fact of Afghan political life. 
Afghanistan has no history of secular democracy. The characterization of Afghanistan by the 19th 
Century British diplomat Sir Henry Rawlinson as "consist[ing] of a mere collection of tribes, of unequal 
power and divergent habits, which are held together more or less closely, according to the personal 
character of the chief who rules them. The feeling of patriotism, as it is known in Europe, cannot exist 
among Afghans, for there is no common country" is still true today and suggests critical nuances for any 
realistic Afghanistan reconstruction and future political agenda.  
 
The fragmentation and complexity of Afghanistan presents particular challenges to reconstruction as well 
as to peaceful, stable post-Taliban country free of terrorists. To understand Afghanistan, one must 
recognize and be sensitive to the fact that group identities and power relationships as well as coalitions 
are based on ethno-linguistic affinities. Pashtuns have traditionally been the dominant ethnic group and 
the Afghan state has in the past been a tool for Pashtun domination. The second most prominent ethnic-
linguistic group is the Tajiks who represent the Afghan Persian-speaking, nontribal population such as 
that found in Khan's Herat and Western Provinces. Other prominent Afghan ethno-linguistic groups 
include the Uzbeks, Hazaras, Nuristani, Baluch and Brahaui. The peaceful coexistence of the different 
groups has been destroyed by 25 years of war that witnessed scores of atrocities committed by one 
group against another. Each of these groups continue to dominate the lives of Afghans in particular 
regions and locales. 
 
One must be sensitive to this ethno-linguistic fragmentation. It is probably unrealistic to expect that the 
post-Taliban government in Kabul over the short term will have much significant control over regional and 
local power relationships that have long dominated. Kabul can serve a useful mediating role in conflicts at 
the regional level, but over the short to medium term that is about all that can realistically be expected.  
It is instructive to recognize that during the Sawr (or April) Revolution in the late 1970s, Soviet-supported 
Afghan Communists attempted to institute certain development policies, including land reforms, that 
disregarded local and regional ethnic realities and relationships. These policies failed miserably and led to 
civil upheaval and Ismail Khan's original revolt. Any future Afghan reconstruction plan formulated in Kabul 
and imposed on the regions in disregard to local realities will most certainly meet the same fate. 
Reconstruction must have as a goal the restoration of basic economic and social infrastructures not the 
rebuilding of the entire state or country from the top down. A regional reconstruction strategy has the 
added benefit of minimizing competition of control of the central government and giving a vested interest 
to local leaders such as Ismail Khan for the maintenance of peace. It must be remember that people's 
allegiance is primarily with ethnic and tribal groups and local authorities[22].  
Recent Events 
The relationship between Khan and Karzai is an excellent near-term indicator of the success of the future 
Afghan state. Khan is viewed by many as one of the main obstacles to Karzai's efforts to extend his 
authority outside Kabul. If this is a valid assumption then the past months have seen some extremely 
troubling indicators. 
 
On March 21, 2004, bloody conflict erupted in Herat between Khan's forces and those loyal to the central 
government after a reported failed assassination attempt on the life of Khan and the killing of Khan's son, 
Aviation Minister Mirwais Sadiq[23]. This fighting, which represents some of the worst seen Herat since 
the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, erupted after Sadiq was killed as he went to investigate the earlier 
assassination attempt of his father.  
 
While accounts of exactly what happened vary widely, according to an account by U.N. workers in 
Afghanistan as reported in the New Yorker,  
Tensions had been mounting between Khan and one of his bitter rivals, General Abdul 
Zaher Naibzadah, who had been appointed by the central government to head the 
Afghan 17th division, over control of the Afghan military's Herat garrison. Khan's son 
heard reports that there had been an assassination attempt on his father, and drove to 
the General's house, where Naibzadah's bodyguards gunned him down, along with 
others. According to the U.N. dispatch, Ismail Khan took violent revenge on his attackers, 
burning down the local headquarters of the Afghan militia and killing scores. Some press 
accounts put the death toll of the subsequent daylong battle at a hundred or more; other 
accounts, emanating from Kabul, said that fewer than two-dozen were killed. The U.N. 
account included reports that a personal phone call from Karzai to Khan was necessary 
to defuse the situation." During the next days, a division of the Afghan National Army 
consisting of fifteen hundred soldiers was sent to Herat to restore order[24]. 
The U.N. Report cited by the New Yorker suggested, that Khan "may become even more intractable in his 
dealing with the central government[25]." 
 
According to the BBC , during a visit to Herat, Karzai demanded that Khan disarm his forces as part of a 
nationwide plan to disarm 40,000 fighters by June[26]. Karzai also suggested that Khan would not be 
allowed to keep his private militia. Do not expect this disarmament or the voluntary dismantlement of 
Khan's militia to happen any time soon! 
 
Three times this year Hamid Karzai has dispatched troops from the newly formed Afghan national army to 
combat factional fighting and disarm regional militias. Most recently, in late June, Afghan troops with 
"embedded" U.S. military trainers were sent to the province of Ghor to assert central government control. 
These actions to impose authority in the provinces and disarm militias have had limited success. 
Conclusion 
Ismail Kahn personifies how difficult it is for the U.S. to separate its enemies from its allies in Afghanistan. 
"If Mohammed Fahim is a government minister and Ismail Khan is a warlord," one American official [has 
suggested], "you're abusing the language." The official's point was that Khan has provided better security 
and more stability for the local population than is found in other Afghan provinces, and international 
observers believe that he would probably win a provincial election. But he treats Herat as a private 
fiefdom, and has alarmed many in the United States with his vocal support of Iran; last fall, he was quoted 
as calling it "the best model of an Islamic country in the world[27]."  
 
Khan is a legendary Afghan commander and has been a fixture in Western Afghanistan for decades. He 
is extremely popular with the forces he has led since his original mutiny against the Taraki regime's Sawr 
(or April) Revolution. As Ahmed Rashid has written, "few mujahideen commanders have the prestige of 
Ismail Khan and few have sacrificed more than the people of Herat during the war against the 
Soviets[28]." While it is not without its blemishes, Khan has established an effective administration and 
has won the respect of the people. It is a fact that Herat under Khan's leadership is thriving relative to the 
rest of Afghanistan. 
 
Ismail Khan has and probably will continue to have significant relationships with his powerful neighbor, 
Iran - a fact that should not be viewed as surprising considering Afghan history or his personal history. 
But evidence suggesting that he is controlled by or acts as an Iranian lackey is far from convincing. Khan 
time and time again has demonstrated his independence and disdain of foreign influence.  
 
It is instructive to review Khan's passionate desire for greater unity from foreign influence of mujahideen 
field commanders when he organized the first meeting for field commanders in the Ghor province in July 
1987. "Over one thousand commanders from across Afghanistan attended the conference. They adopted 
twenty resolutions of which the most important was the demand that they, rather than the Peshawar 
leaders, dictate the political movement. 'The right of determining the future destiny of Afghanistan lies with 
the heirs of the martyrs and with the Muslims of the trenches, who are struggling in bloody fronts and are 
ready to be martyred. Nobody else is allowed to make decisions determining the fate of the nation[29].' 
 
Ismail Khan will use the Iranian resources to benefit Herat; it is extremely unlikely that he will allow Iran or 
anybody else -- including the leadership in Kabul -- to replace him as "Amir" of Western Afghanistan. 
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